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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, a public entity, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D. 
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE 
BARROWS; ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an 
individual, d/b/a THE PAWN SHOP, 
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah Corporation; 
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual, 
d/b/a JIM'S RIBS; TERRY PANTELAKIS, 
an individual, d/b/a AAA JEWELERS 
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND SALES, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 870236 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS (RDA) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant 
to the provisions of g§ 3 and 5, Article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution; §78-2-2 Utah Code Ann., 1953 (1987 Supp.), and 
Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the landowners are entitled to both 
possession pendente lite of the property being condemned and 
interest on the funds deposited as a condition for immediate 
occupancy by the RDA as provided in an agreed Order of 
Immediate Occupancy which, if effective, would have given the 
RDA possession pendente lite of the property. 
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2. Are the landowners entitled to an award of expert 
witness fees as "costs" in this matter? 
3. Are the landowners entitled to an award of costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in bringing this Appeal? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a condemnation matter in which the RDA sought an 
Order of Immediate Occupancy. Negotiations by and between the 
RDA, the landowners of the property being condemned, and 
adjacent owners not parties to the condemnation matter 
resulted in a Stipulated Order containing various terms and 
provisions upon which possession pendente lite of the subject 
property would be given to the RDA. Under said agreement, the 
funds required to be deposited by the RDA under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78-34-9 were, contrary to said statute, to be invested so as 
to draw interest while on deposit with the Clerk of the Court. 
Although the funds were deposited by the Agency, the terms and 
conditions of the Order of Immediate Occupancy never came to 
fruition and the landowners retained the exclusive use and 
possession, and income, of the property until the Final Order 
of Condemnation was entered some twenty-two months later. 
The offer by the condemnor to the landowners was in the 
sum of $275,000 for the property being acquired. The land-
owners chose not to accept said sum and the case was tried on 
the issue of value. The landowners claimed the value of the 
property to be approximately $660,000• The jury found the 
fair market value of the property to be $305,000. Subsequent 
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to the trial, the landowners filed a Motion to Tax as "Costs11 
fees allegedly paid to five expert witnesses, three of which 
were called to testify at trial. The sum total of said 
"expenses11 was $18,402.67. 
In addition to the above motion the landowners asked the 
District Court to award them interest on the funds deposited 
pursuant to the Order of Immediate Occupancy. The trial court 
denied both the landowners1 motion for interest and for an 
award of expert witness fees and trial preparation expenses as 
costs. An appeal has been taken from the denial of these two 
motions• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendants Burge, Barrows, and Barrows, (hereinafter 
referred to as "landowners") were the owners of real property 
located at 62, 64, and 66 East 200 South in Salt Lake City. 
The other named Defendants were, at the time of the condemna-
tion, tenants occupying the above described properties. 
In 1984 and 85 Lincoln Property Company (hereinafter 
referred to as "Lincoln") was interested, or at least contem-
plated, the redevelopment of the entire Block 57 of downtown 
Salt Lake City and had acquired substantial holdings in the 
block with that contemplated objective in mind. Seven of the 
landowners within the block filed a lawsuit contesting the 
inclusion within the redevelopment project area of their 
property claiming certain irregularities and other defects in 
the redevelopment project plan. The RDA was defending that 
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action primarily on the statute of limitations and its 
interpretation of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act. That 
matter was filed before Judge Raymond Uno in the Third 
Judicial District Court In and For Salt Lake County and is 
presently on appeal before this Court. The ruling of Judge 
Uno was to the effect that the RDA could not acquire by 
condemnation or threat of condemnation the properties owned by 
those specific landowners. The effect of Judge Uno's decision 
was to create serious impediment to Lincoln Property's ability 
to develop the block and created considerable negotiation 
leverage in landowners who may be dealing with Lincoln 
Property. Lincoln was becoming increasingly discouraged and 
disenchanted with the prospects of being able to put together 
a sufficient size property package. That disenchantment 
became increasingly manifest both to the RDA and the land-
owners. Lincoln expressed interest in commencing the under-
taking only if they could be assured of acquiring the entire 
north one-third of Block 57. Many landowners in that area 
were desirous, in fact, almost desperate, to sell their 
increasingly and rapidly deteriorating property to Lincoln and 
several of them had signed options to that effect. 
It was in this condition that the landowners herein were 
approached and became, for all practical purposes, the last 
holdouts in that block. The RDA filed a condemnation action 
in an effort to acquire the property and to insure that 
Lincoln would have the requisite ground necessary to undertake 
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the initial development of the block. It was necessary that 
the RDA obtain at least a preliminary indication from the 
Court of its right to acquire the property and, therefore, the 
Agency sought an Order of Immediate Occupancy. The landowners 
appeared and contested the right of the RDA to take the 
subject property. Those landowners who were desirous to sell 
to Lincoln appeared at the scheduled hearing on the Order of 
Immediate Occupancy solely for the purpose of attempting to 
mediate or negotiate with the landowners herein for the 
purpose of trying to persuade them to allow the condemnation 
of the property and the redevelopment of the block to occur. 
What resulted was a offer on the part of the neighboring 
owners to "sweeten" the deal being offered the condemnees. 
These other owners offered to give the landowners herein 
$76,450 of the "just compensation" which they would have 
received from the RDA for their property as additional "Boot" 
to the condemnees herein if the condemnees would agree to 
allow their property to be condemned, but still preserving in 
said condemnees the right to a jury trial on the issue of just 
compensation. The $76,450 would be paid to the condemnees 
irrespective of what the jury awarded them and would not be 
any "offset" to that jury award, but would be in addition to 
rather than in lieu of or part of said payment. Accordingly, 
a tri-parte agreement and Order of Immediate Occupancy was 
entered into and prepared which basically set forth the 
following terms and provisions. 
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1. The RDA would pay in to the Clerk of the Court the 
$275,220 (100% of the appraised value of the subject property) 
for the use and benefit of the landowners pursuant to the UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78-34-9. One important caveat, however, was 
imposed on the RDA. Under the statute, that sum would not 
draw interest, but as a further accommodation to the land-
owners herein, the RDA agreed the funds would be invested by 
the Clerk of the Court at the highest interest rate available 
in a federally insured account with a guaranteed minimum of 
11.5 annual percentage rate. If the funds did not earn that 
minimum rate, the shortfall was agreed to be made up by the 
RDA. 
2* Within ten (10) days of entry of the Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, the RDA was to submit to Lincoln Proper-
ties an Agreement for Distribution of Land (ADL) . That ADL 
was required to be fully signed by both the RDA and Lincoln 
within thirty (30) days of entry of the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy. 
3. After the ADL was signed, the owners of the property 
located at 235 South Main Street (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Mortensen Group11) would allow the RDA to pay to the 
landowners herein $76,450 as "additional compensation" over 
and above any just compensation ultimately found by the jury 
to be the fair market value of the property being condemned. 
4. The Order of Immediate Occupancy specifically 
provided that it would H. . . not be effective unless or 
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until, (1) the ADL is signed by Lincoln Property and the 
Redevelopment Agency within thirty (30) days from date hereof, 
and the sum of $76,450 above provided has been paid pursuant 
to the terms and provisions herein, or, (2) the defendant 
landowners have withdrawn all or part of the $275,220 depo-
sited with the Clerk of the Court as herein provided." 
It is uncontested that neither of the conditions provided 
in paragraph 4 above occurred. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The rights and obligations inherent and incorporated in 
the Order of Immediate Occupancy never came to fruition 
because the terms and conditions precedent to the effective-
ness to the order never, in fact, occurred. The RDA never 
obtained possession of the subject property pendente lite and 
by its own terms and provisions said Order never became 
effective. The RDA did not receive any of the rights and 
privileges of the Order and, conversely, it is not obligated 
for any of the duties imposed by said Order because the same 
never took effect. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LANDOWNERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO BOTH 
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY AND INTEREST ON 
FUNDS DEPOSITED AS PROVIDED IN THE ORDER 
OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY WHEN THE ORDER OF 
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY, BY ITS OWN TERMS 
NEVER CAME INTO EFFECT. 
Copies of the final executed Order of Immediate Occupancy 
together with the first working draft of the Order of Imme-
7 
diate Occupancy are attached hereto as Exhibit MAfl and "BM 
respectively for the Court1s convenience. In the original 
draft, the conditions precedent to the effectiveness of the 
Order were specified and set forth but required, upon the non-
occurrence thereof, that a Motion be made by one of the 
parties to vacate the Order of Occupancy. 
(d) If the ADL is not signed by Lincoln 
Property and/or the Redevelopment Agency within 
thirty (30) days from date hereof, or the defendant 
land owners have not withdrawn all or part of the 
$275,220.00 deposited with the Clerk of the Court as 
herein provided, or if the sum of $76,450.00 above 
provided has not been paid pursuant to the terms and 
provisions herein, then this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy is null and void and upon Motion of either 
of the parties, said Order of Immediate Occupancy 
may be vacated upon a showing that the terms and 
provisions herein have not been complied with. 
(Exhibit "B", paragraph 1(d), page 6.) 
At the request of the landowners1 counsel the above 
provision was made self-executory in the event the conditions 
precedent did not occur. In other words, the landowners did 
not want to have to file a Motion and seek an Order vacating 
the Order of Immediate Occupancy if the conditions precedent 
did not occur. At their request the language of the Order was 
changed to read as follows: 
(d) This Order of Occupancy shall not be 
effective unless or until, (1) the ADL is signed by 
Lincoln Property and the Redevelopment Agency within 
thirty (30) days from date hereof, and the sum of 
$76,450.00 above provided has been paid pursuant to 
the terms and provisions herein, or (2) the defen-
dant land owners have withdrawn all or part of the 
$275,220.00 deposited with the Clerk of the Court as 
herein provided. 
(Exhibit "A", paragraph 1(d), page 6.) 
8 
Neither of the conditions in the Order ever occurred. 
The RDA# after Lincoln had dropped out of the picture com-
pletely as a prospective business developer, decided to 
proceed with acquisition of the property in this condemnation 
matter. The matter went to trial as if no Order of Immediate 
Occupancy had been entered. The RDA put on evidence of its 
right to take the property as required by law. The case did 
not go to trial on the sole issue of just compensation. The 
landowners could have challenged the right to take and, in 
fact, preserved that defense through to the time of trial. 
They made only a token objection to the right to take and the 
Court determined that the RDA did have the right and power of 
condemnation of the subject property. 
The landowners presented evidence at trial that the 
subject property was worth $660,000. The jury found the fair 
market value of the property to be $305,000. During the 
twenty-two months between the Order of Immediate Occupancy and 
the entry of a Final Order of Condemnation, the landowners 
continued to collect the rental from the tenants in an 
aggregate amount of $1,950 per month for a total of $42,900. 
In addition, the landowners claim that by virtue of the Order 
of Immediate Occupancy they are entitled to $58,025.55 
interest on the funds deposited with the Clerk of the Court. 
The incongruity of that position is apparent. The Landowners 
want to retain possession of the property pendente lite with 
all of the attendant benefits thereof (approximately $43,000 
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rental) and receives all of the benefits of the Order of 
Immediate Occupancy ($58#000 interest) as if the RDA, in fact, 
had possession of the property and the Order had become 
effective. The landowners have never offered to offset the 
interest with the rental until the Opening Brief was filed in 
this case: 
The remedy in the event of the non-occurrence 
of a condition not material to the plaintiff is for 
the plaintiff to be required to fulfill its duty by 
paying interest in full as required under the terms 
of the contract less the cost of what was not 
performed, which in this case would b an offset for 
the benefit to the plaintiff of the net rent it 
would have received had possession been given. 
(Appellants1 Opening Brief, page 37) 
The RDA is willing either to have the Order nun pro tune 
effective and pay the interest it agreed to, but with the 
attendant right to receive possession of and the income from 
the property. But the clear language of the Order of Imme-
diate Occupancy is that the same is not effective unless one 
of the two conditions precedent occur. Since neither of them 
occurred, possession reposed rightfully in the landowners 
until the condemnation matter was concluded and the agreement 
or obligation to pay interest on the deposited funds never 
became effect. 
POINT II 
THE LANDOWNERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN 
AWARD OF EXPERT WITNESS FEES AS "COSTS" 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CODE ANN. 
511-19-23.9. 
This is an issue of first impression before this Court 
and has substantial ramifications and effect and, therefore, 
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it is the desire of the RDA to treat the matter with much more 
depth than has been argued in the Appellants1 Brief. 
The right of condemnees to an award of expert witness 
fees and trial preparation costs (hereinafter referred to as 
••litigation expenses") as part of "costs" has been addressed 
numerous times by a great many courts. Most states do not 
have any specific statutory provision dealing with the issue 
and, therefore, the claim is asserted under the argument that 
to require the landowner to pay litigation expenses out of the 
"just compensation" awarded for the taking of the property 
denies the landowner his constitutional right to just compen-
sation for the property and/or due process of law. The 
overwhelming weight of authority is that the failure to tax as 
costs the litigation expenses incurred by the condemnee does 
not violate federal or state constitutional guarantees that 
the condemnee will receive just compensation for the property 
being taken. 
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Rodrigues, 43 
Haw. 195, 197 (1959), this court adopted the measure 
of compensation for land taken by the power of 
eminent domain contained in 4 Nichols, Eminent 
Domain §§ 12.2 and 12.2[1] (3d ed.): 
"It is well settled that, when a parcel 
of land is taken for public use by the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain, 
the measure of compensation is the fair 
market value of the land. [Citation 
omitted.] 
"By fair market value is meant the 
amount of money which a purchaser willing 
but not obliged to buy the property would 
pay to an owner willing but not obliged to 
sell it, taking into consideration all 
uses to which the land was adapted and 
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might in reason be applied." [Citation 
omitted.] 
This definition of "just compensation" contains no 
reference to attorneys1 fees or litigation costs. 
We hold in accordance with the overwhelming 
weight of authority that attorneys1 fees and 
expenses, including expert witness' fees, are not 
embraced within the meaning of "just compensation" 
for purposes of article I, section 18 of the Hawaii 
Constitution, Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368, 
50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904 (1930); City of Muskeegon 
v. Slater, 379 Mich. 466, 470-471, 152 N.W.2d 632, 
645 (1967) ; Leadville Water Company v. Parkville 
Water District, 164 Colo. 362, 365-366, 436 P.2d 
659, 660 (1967); Lamar v. Urban Renewal Agency of 
City of Reno, 84 Nev. 580, 581, 445 P.2d 869, 870 
(1968); 9.88 Acres of Land v. State, supra, 274 A. 
2d at 140; Bowers v. Fulton County, supra, 227 Ga. 
at 815, 183 S.E.2d at 348; County of Los Angeles v. 
Ortiz, supra, 6 Cal.3d at 148, 98 Cal.Rptr. at 459, 
490 P.2d at 1147; 4A Nichols, Eminent Domain, §§ 
14.249 [3] and 14.249 [4] (3d ed. 1971). Contra, 
Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So.2d 602, 604-605 
(Fla.1950). In so holding, we adopt the reasoning 
of the Supreme Court of Delaware in 9.88 Acres of 
Land v. State, supra, 21A A.2d at 140: 
The argument is that the owner is 
deprived of "just compensation" when it 
must expend a substantial portion of the 
award, founded upon fair market value of 
the property, for the necessary services 
of counsel and experts; and this is 
especially so, says the owner, when the 
final offer of the condemnor is greatly 
less than the value ultimately esta-
blished. 
The argument appeals to the sense of 
fairness, but it has no tenable basis in 
constitutional law. . . . 
[Authorities propound the 
rationale of fairness that may motivate 
legislative relief in this area; but they 
cast no doubt upon the force and effect of 
the general rule of constitutional law we 
here endorse: in the absence of statute, 
there is no right to counsel fees [and 
litigation costs] in condemnation cases, 
and the deprivation of such fees does not 
violate any constitutional right. 
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If an adjustment in the law of eminent 
domain is dictated by fairness in this 
connection, it is a matter for considera-
tion and action by the [legislature]. 
(State v. Davis, 499 P.2d 663, 667-668 (Haw. 1972)) 
In the above cited case entitled 9.88 Acres of Land v. 
State, 274 A.2d 139 Del.Supr. (1971) the court further 
explained its holding as follows: 
Despite seemingly unfair invasion of the award for 
necessary legal representation in the trial of an 
issue not sought by the property owner, counsel fees 
are not within the "just compensation11 to be paid 
for property taken, except as may be expressly 
provided by statute. In withholding counsel fees, 
there is no denial of "just compensation" in the 
constitutional sense. For the federal 
constitutional rule, se E. g., Dohany v. Rogers, 281 
U.S. 362, 50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904 (1929)1; In re 
Clark1s Estate (5 Cir., 1951) 187 F.2d 1003; for the 
state constitutional rule, see E. g., Leadville 
Water Co. v. Parkville Water District, 164 Colo. 
362, 436 P.2d 659 (1968); In re Condemnation of 
Property of J. Ward Kling, 433 Pa. 118, 249 A.2d 552 
(1969); 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 14.249(4). 
The owner relies upon In re Board of Rapid 
Transit Comfrs, 128 App.Div. 103, 112 N.Y.S. 619 
(1908); 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 14.249(4), p. 
706; 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) § 812; and 
27 Am.Jur. (2d) "Eminent Domain" § 473. These 
authorities propound the rationale of fairness that 
may motivate legislative relief in this area; but 
they case no doubt upon the force and effect of the 
general rule of constitutional law we here endorse: 
in the absence of statute, there is no right to 
counsel fees in condemnation cases, and the depriva-
tion of such fees does not violate any constitu-
tional right. 
If an adjustment in the law of eminent domain 
is dictated by fairness in this connection, it is a 
matter for consideration and action by the General 
Assembly. 
Accordingly, we hold that there was no error in 
the Trial Court1s denial of the ownerfs petition for 
allowance of counsel fees. 
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Similarly, there is no constitutional require-
ment that the owner be reimbursed for expert 
consultant fees in a condemnation case. 
(274 A.2d at 140.) 
In the recent United States Supreme Court case of United 
States vs. Bodcaw Co, 440 U.S. 202, 99 S.C. 1066, 59 L.Ed.2d 
257 (1979) , the court explained the basis for acceptance of 
the principle that litigation expenses are not part of the 
just compensation award in condemnation matters: 
The Fifth Amendment forbids the taking of 
••private property . . . for public use without just 
compensation. •• This Court has often faced the 
problem of defining just compensation. One prin-
ciple from which it has not deviated is that just 
compensation "is for the property, and not to the 
owner. •• Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United 
States, 148 U.S. 312, 326, 13 S.Ct. 622, 626, 37 
L.Ed. 463 (1893). As a result, indirect cots to the 
property owner caused by the taking of his land are 
generally not part of the just compensation to which 
he is constitutionally entitled. See, e.g. Dohany 
v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904 
(1930); Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 45 
S.Ct. 293, 69 L.Ed. 644 (1925); Joslin Mfg. Co. V. 
Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 43 S.Ct. 684, 67 L.Ed. 
1167 (1923). See generally 4A J. Sackman, Nichols1 
Law of Eminent Domain, ch. 14 (rev. 3d ed. 1977) . 
Thus, [attorneys' fees and expenses are not 
embraced within just compensation . . ••' Dohany v. 
Rogers, supra, 281 U.S. at 368, 50 S.Ct. at 302. 
(440 U.S. at 203.) 
The Bodcaw decision was recently followed in D.O.P. v. 
Winston Container Company, 263 S.E. 2d 830 (Ct.App.N.C. 1980). 
At the outset we note that litigation expenses 
and costs, including those incurred by a landowner 
in a condemnation proceeding, may be taxed only if 
authorized by statute. City of Charlotte v. 
McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 190 S.E.2d 179 (1972). Such 
expenses incurred by the landowner do not constitute 
part of the "just compensation" required to be paid 
by the Fifth Amendment, compensation therefor being 
a matter of legislative grace rather than constitu-
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tional command. United States v. Bodcaw Company, 
440 U.S. 202, 99 S.Ct. 1066, 59 L.Ed.2d 257 (1979). 
(263 S.E. 2d at 831.) 
It is clear from the abundance of precedent above set 
forth that if the landowners are entitled to compensation for 
litigation expenses, it must be provided within a specific 
statutory provision which would vary the overwhelming author-
ity against such an award. 
In Schwartz v. Western Power and Gas Company, 208 Kan. 
844, 494 P.2d 1113 (1972) the court stated: 
In this case the trial court and also the 
appellant and appellees recognize the general rule 
in Kansas that attorney fees and expenses of 
litigation other than statutory court costs incurred 
by a party to an action, are not chargeable as costs 
against the defeated party in the absence of a clear 
specific statutory provision therefor. It is 
further conceded that the Kansas Eminent Domain 
Statute, K.S.A. 26-501 et seg. contains no such 
provision. 
(494 P.2d at 1116.) 
It is also stated that such statutory provisions must be 
••clear11 in their awarding of the litigation expenses as part 
of costs. 
Costs are the creature of statute, and unless 
the statute clearly provides for them courts cannot 
tax them. Waterbury v. Macken, 100 Conn. 407. 413, 
124 A. 5; Lew v. Bray, 81 Conn. 213, 217, 70 A. 628; 
Condon v. Pomroy-Grace, 73 Conn. 607, 614, 48 A. 
756, 53 L.R.A. 696; see Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 
357. The term ,fcosts of the court11 has Ma known 
technical meaning, as well understood by lawyers as 
the term suit or prosecution." 
(Drive-in and Shop, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of 
the City of Norwich, 24 Conn.Sup.390, 191 A.2d 345 
(1963)) 
The specific statute under which the landowners herein 
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claim expert witness fees is UTAH CODE ANN. 511-19-23.9 which 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Within the project area an agency may: 
* * * 
(2) acquire real property by eminent domain; but 
when the power of eminent domain is exercised under 
the provisions of this chapter and the party whose 
property is affected contests the matter in the 
district court, the court may, in cases where the 
amount of the award exceeds the amount offered, 
award in addition to his just compensation, costs, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee as determined 
by the court. The court, or jury in cases tried 
before a jury, may also award a reasonable sum as 
compensation for the costs and expenses, if any, of 
relocating the owner whose property is acquired or a 
party conducting a business on such acquired 
property. An award may also be made for damages to 
any fixtures or personal property owned by the owner 
of such acquired property, if such fixtures or 
personal property are damages as a result of such 
acquisition or relocation. 
Examination of the specific statute in question reveals 
the following: 
1. The statute is permissive and discretionary with the 
Court. It does not require that the Court award "costs" but 
indicates that the Court "may" in cases where the amount of 
the award exceeds the amount offered add to the just compensa-
tion "costs". 
2. No where in the statute is "costs" defined. 
3. The word "costs" appears a second time in the 
statute but not singularly. The second time it appears in the 
statute involves claims which may be made to the jury for 
"compensation for the costs and expenses, if any, of relocat-
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ing the owner whose property is acquired or a party conducting 
a business on such acquired property." 
This court is not without assistance from sister states 
who have considered this same issue. Counsel has been able to 
find four states which have interpreted similar statutes which 
provide for the payment of ,fcostsM, as to whether or not those 
costs include "litigation expenses"• 
The Oklahoma procedure to establish value in a condemna-
tion matter utilizes a commissioners report which is review-
able by the District Court and a jury trial afforded the 
parties on the issue of value upon demand by either of them. 
Concerning this level of proceedings, the Oklahoma statute 
provides: 
If the party demanding such trial does not 
recover a verdict more favorable to him than the 
assessment of the commissioners, all costs in the 
district court may be taken against him. 
(66 O.S. 1971 §55) 
The next section in the Oklahoma Code, §56, allows an 
appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court from the District Court 
to a dissatisfied litigant. It provides, in part: 
• . . and in no case shall said corporation 
[condemnor] be liable for the costs of such review 
or appeal unless the owner of such real property 
shall be adjudged entitled, upon their review or 
appeal, to a greater amount of damages than was 
awarded by said commissioners. The corporation 
[condemnor] shall in all cases pay the costs and 
expenses of the first assessment. . . • 
(66 O.S. 1971 §56) 
In Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority v. Lindauer, 534 
P.2d 682 (Okl. 1975), the landowner had obtained a "slight 
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excess" over the commissioners award and sought to tax as 
"costs" his "litigation expenses" in the amount of $2,100 for 
two expert witnesses who testified at trial as to the value of 
the property. The court acknowledged that the landowner had 
met the threshold issue of being the "prevailing" party on the 
merits, but construed the Oklahoma statute so as not to cover 
"litigation expenses" as a part of costs. 
. . . In the instant case, the appellant owners 
were successful in increasing the commissioners' 
award and are entitled to recover cost of the jury 
trial. 
There is no common-law rule that permits 
recovery of expenses of litigation. If any such 
right exists, it must be statutory. Kerr v. United 
Collection Service, Okl., 267 P.2d 611 (1954); 
Sarkeys v. Haas, Okl., 402 P.2d 894 (1965). 
Bottomed on this principle, this jurisdiction has 
not allowed the recover of attorney's fees as cost 
unless authorized by statute or expressly made a 
part of an agreement. Keel v. Covey, 206 Okl. 128, 
241 P.2d 954 (1952); Davis v. National Pioneer 
Insurance Company, Okl.Ct.App., 515 P.2d 580 (1973). 
For an example of a statute which does allow 
attorney fees in a condemnation cause, see 11 O.S. 
1971 § 1613(f). 
We know of no statutory authority allowing 
recovery as cost, the litigation expense incurred in 
presenting an expert witness at trial other than the 
usual statutory witness fees, 28 O.S. 1971, §§ 81, 
82. Recovery of the statutory witness fee was not 
the issue in this appeal. The trial court did not 
err in refusing appellant owners' application to 
recover the expenses incurred in calling expert 
witness to testify at the jury trial. "Under the 
ordinary statute costs do not include • . . the fees 
of expert witnesses." Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
3rd Edition, Vol. 1, § 4.109. 
(534 P.2d at 685.) 
One week later that same Supreme Court construed another 
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section of its eminent domain statute regarding "costs" with 
the identical result. 
Pursuant to 69 O.S.1971 § 1203(e)(f) [which 
provides as follows] 
(e) . . . If the party demanding such 
trial does not recover a verdict more 
favorable to him than the assessment of 
the commissioners, all costs in the 
District Court shall be taxed against him. 
(f) . . . and in no case shall the 
Department be liable for the costs on such 
review of appeal unless the owner of the 
real property shall be adjudged entitled, 
upon either review or appeal, to a greater 
amount of damages than was awarded by the 
commissioners. 
if Mrs. Gaylord recovers a verdict more favorable to 
her than the $50,000.00 assessment of the commis-
sioners as accepted by the trial court, she will be 
entitled to all costs of trial and this appeal. But 
attorneys1 fees and expenses are not embraced within 
just compensation for land taken by eminent domain 
Dohaney v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 3672, 50 S.Ct. 299, 74 
L.Ed. 904, 68 A.L.R. 434 (1930). 
Although attorneys1 fees may properly be 
awarded in inverse condemnation proceedings, no 
statutory authority exists for awarding attorneys1 
fees or costs rests upon statutes and cannot be 
allowed or recovered unless given by statute. Evans 
v. Central Life Ins. Co., 87 Kan. 641, 125 P. 86 
(1912); JCeel v. Covey, 206 Okl. 128, 241 P.2d 954 
(1952), Ex Parte Kelly, 261 P.2d 452 (Okl. 1953). 
(Gaylord v. State Department of Highways, 540 P. 2d 
558, 562 (Okl. 1975).) 
A similar result occurred in Nevada when that state's 
highest court interpreted its eminent domain statute similar 
to UTAH CODE ANN. fill-19-23.9 which allowed a discretionary 
taxing of "costs". 
With regard to costs in an eminent domain case, 
our statute provides that "Costs may be allowed or 
not, and if allowed may be apportioned between the 
parties on the same or adverse sides, in the 
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discretion of the court," NRS 37.190. Here, the 
property owners contend that they are entitled to 
recover the fee charged by their expert appraiser 
for his appraisal report ($475) and court testimony 
($150). The district court denied recovery for the 
report, but did allow $100 for the court testimony 
of the expert. 
Our statute was borrowed from California. See 
Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 1255. The California 
courts, after noting that the code does not specify 
what items may be included as costs, have ruled that 
they are the same as those recoverable in ordinary 
civil actions. People v. Bowman, 173 Cal.App.2d 
416, 343 P.2d 267 (1959). We approve that construc-
tion. Since our general costs statutes do not 
provide for the inclusion of the cost of securing an 
appraisal report or the expert fee of an expert 
witness (NRS 48.290(1) limits witness fees as costs 
to $5 for each day's attendance in court), we must 
conclude that the lower court correctly denied 
recovery for the cost of the report, but erred in 
allowing more than $5 for the witness fee. 
(Andrews v. Kingsbury General Improve. Dist. No. 2, 
436 P.2d 813, 814-815 (Nev. 1968).) 
The above decisions are consistent with and follow the 
rationale of decisions of some antiquity which have consis-
tently construed the use of the word "costs" in similar type 
statutes as to be the "ordinary and usual costs attending 
trials and allowed under statutory provisions." 
Section 1022 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
provides that "costs are allowed of course, to the 
plaintiff, upon a judgment in his favor," in certain 
specified actions, among which are not included 
those commenced for the purpose of condemning real 
property under the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain. It is provided in section 1025 of the same 
Code that in actions other than those mentioned in 
section 1022 "costs may be allowed or not, * * * 
in the discretion of the court. * * *" These two 
sections are found in the chapter of the Code 
entitled "Costs." Section 1255 of the same Code, 
contained in a "title" which is headed "Eminent 
Domain," so far as its language is material here, is 
identical with section 1025. 
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There is no legislative declaration in this 
state as to the meaning of the word "costs" (7 
Cal.Jur. 280), but that word has a generally 
accepted meaning throughout the country. The import 
of the word, we think, is not broad enough to 
include such items as the trial court here allowed 
to respondent. Our research has uncovered but one 
case (In re Commissioners of Palisades Park, 83 
Misc. Rep. 186, 144 N.Y.S. 782) in which it has been 
decided that the fees of experts are properly 
chargeable as costs. The decision was rendered 
under a ruling of the trial court which had allowed 
them. The ruling was based, however, upon a special 
statute relating to proceedings in eminent domain, 
and which provided that the court should tax and 
allow as costs "such costs, fees and expenses to the 
commissioners of appraisal and other persons 
performing any legal duty in the premises" as the 
court "shall think equitable and right." It would 
appear that the appellate court's construction of 
the special statute, which was different from our 
legislative enactments in material particulars, was 
eminently proper. There are decisions from several 
states to the effect that fees paid to experts in 
condemnation cases are not included in the word 
"costs." Some of the cases from these states are 
City of St. Louis v. Meintz, supra; In re Grace 
Crossing Commissioners, 19 Misc. Rep. 230, 43 N.Y.S. 
1073; In re Rapid Transit Commissioners, 103 App. 
Div. 530, 93 N.Y.S. 262; In re City of Pittsburgh, 
supra. 
It has been determined in Bathgate v. Irvine, 
126 Cal. 1335, 58 P. 442, 77 Am. St. Rep. 158, that 
in an action to quiet title fees paid to experts may 
not be allowed as costs. The taxation of costs in 
such actions is regulated by the provisions of 
section 1025 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but 
section 1255, relating to condemnation proceedings, 
is cast in the same language as section 1025. It 
would seem, therefore, that, as the fees of experts 
are not allowable under the latter section they 
cannot be allowable under section 1255. It is said 
in the opinion in Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. Chubb, 
supra, that the costs referred to in section 1255 
"are the ordinary and usual costs attending trials 
and allowed under statutory provisions." 
(City of Los Angeles v. Vickers, 81 Cal .App. 737, 
254 P. 687, 688 (1927)) 
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This Court has construed similar language in Rule 
54(d)(1), U.R.C.P. with a similar result. In the recent case 
of Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (1980), the plaintiffs 
sought to tax as "costs" expert witnesses who testified in a 
wrongful death action. The district court allowed only the 
statutory travel and per diem expenses. The plaintiff 
appealed claiming that additional "costs" should be taxed as 
"expenses incurred and fees expended necessary to present 
plaintiff's case." This Court held as follows: 
Our basic statutory provision regarding costs, 
Rule 54(d)(1), U.R.C.P., states: 
Except when express provision therefor 
is made either in a statute of this state 
or in these Rules, costs shall be allowed 
as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the Court otherwise directs . . . 
Costs were not recoverable at common law; and are 
therefore generally allowable only in the amounts 
and in the manner provided by statute. 
Our statutes applicable to this controversy are 
Section 21-2-4(5) and (13), U.C.A., 1953, which 
provides that the sheriff shall receive a fee of 
$2.00 for serving a subpoena and $.30 for each mile 
necessarily traveled, in going only. Section 21-5-4 
states: 
Every witness legally required or in 
good faith requested to attend a city or 
district court or a grand jury is entitled 
to $14 per day for each day in attendance 
and 30 cents for each mile actually and 
necessarily traveled in going only; . . . 
Section 21-5-8 further provides that: 
The fees and compensation of witnesses 
in all civil causes must be paid by the 
party who causes such witnesses to attend 
• . . The fees of witnesses paid in civil 
causes may be taxed as costs against the 
losing party. 
Subject to the limitation expressed above, this 
Court has taken the position that the trial court 
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can exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the 
allowance of costs; and that it has a duty to guard 
against any excesses or abuses in the taxing 
thereof. 
In the light of what has been said above, we 
revert to the inquiry: whether the expenses 
incurred by the plaintiffs are properly taxable as 
costs. Rule 54(d)(1), upon which they rely, speaks 
of ••costs," but does not further define that term. 
The generally accepted rule is that it means those 
fees which are required to be paid to the court and 
to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize 
to be included in the judgment. 
There is a distinction to be understood between 
the legitimate and taxable "costs" and other 
"expenses," of litigations which may be ever so 
necessary, but are not properly taxable as costs. 
Consistent with that distinction, the courts hold 
that expert witnesses cannot be awarded extra 
compensation unless the statute expressly so 
provides. 
(605 P.2d at 773-774 (emphasis added).) 
It is submitted that if the legislature had intended the 
word "costs" to include "litigation expenses" it would have 
utilized words other than "costs" and would have been more 
specific. Two provisions of the UTAH CODE dealing with 
eminent domain require the condemnor, in certain instances, to 
reimburse to the landowner "all reasonable and necessary 
expenses actually incurred by the condemnee." The first of 
those statutes involves a condemnation action which has been 
filed but later abandoned by the condemnor. 
In the event that no order is entered by the 
court permitting payment of said deposit on account 
of the just compensation to be awarded in the 
proceeding within thirty (30) days following its 
deposit, the court may, on application of the 
condemning authority, permit the substitution of a 
bond in such amount and with such sureties as shall 
be determined and approved by the court. Condemner, 
whether a public or private body, may, at any time 
prior to final payment of compensation and damages 
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awarded the defendant by the court or jury, abandon 
the proceedings and cause the action to be dismissed 
without prejudice, provided, however, that as a 
condition of dismissal condemner first compensate 
condemnee for all damages he has sustained and also 
reimburse him in full for all reasonable and 
necessary expenses actually incurred by condemnee 
because of the filing of the action by condemner, 
including attorneyfs fees. 
(UTAH CODE ANN. §74-34-16 (emphasis added).) 
The second provision deals with a condemnation action which 
has been concluded and title to the property transferred to 
the condemnor, but the condemnor fails to commence or complete 
construction on the subject property within the reasonable 
time dictated by the court. 
In such action, if the court finds that the 
condemnor, without reasonable justification, did not 
commence or complete construction and use within the 
time specified, it shall enter judgment fixing the 
amount the condemnor has paid the condemnee, as a 
result of condemnation and all amounts due the 
condemnee as damages sustained by reason of condem-
nation, including damages resulting from partial 
completion of the contemplated use, plus all 
reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred 
by the condemnee including attorney fees. 
(UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-19(2) (emphasis added).) 
By looking at the legislatures intention in specifically 
providing language which was broad enough to cover "litigation 
expenses'* in the above two statutes and comparing that with 
the use of the word "costs" in §11-19-23.9, it is clear that 
the latter statute is much more restrictive and was intended 
to be so. Such was the rationale employed by the California 
Supreme Court in construing similar statutes in the case of 
County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz, 98 Cal.Rptr. 454, 490 P.2d 
1142 (1971). 
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The Legislatures intention to exclude litiga-
tion costs as an element in the recovery of costs in 
eminent domain proceedings becomes manifest by 
reference to analogous statutory provisions. 
Section 1255a of the Code of Civil Procedure 
provides that in the event of abandonment of a 
condemnation proceeding the defendant may be 
entitled to recover all necessary expenses incurred, 
including attorneys1 fees. The purpose of the 
section is to remedy the injustice which would occur 
if an unduly acquisitive condemner, dissatisfied 
with an award, brought successive lawsuits against 
the landowner in an attempt to obtain a lower 
judgment, (City of Los Angeles v. Abbott, supra, 
217 Cal. 184, 200, 17 P.2d 993.) The section has 
been amended a number of times since its original 
enactment in 1911 but no provision has been added 
for the payment of litigation costs in circumstances 
other than abandonment. 
(490 P.2d at 1144.) 
Counsel has found only one case which holds contrary to 
the line of cases above described. In Dade County v. Bingham, 
47 So.2d 602 (1950), the Florida Supreme Court held that the 
Florida statute which provided, Mall costs of proceeding shall 
be paid by the petitioner, including a reasonable attorneys' 
fees . . . when construed in light of Section 12 of the 
declaration of rights, FSA, which declares that private 
property shall not be taken •without just compensation1 
required that costs include fees of expert witnesses.11 The 
Dade County case is, however, against the great weight of 
authority in this country to the effect that just compensation 
is not diminished by requiring the condemnee to pay nontaxable 
litigation expenses. 
The trial court properly construed the subject statute 
and the word "costs" therein does, in fact, include only the 
usual and statutorily permitted taxable costs. In the event 
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the Court rules otherwise, it is important that additional 
factors be considered and incorporated as part of the Courts 
opinion, since this is a case of first impression under the 
statute. In this matter the landowners filed an Affidavit in 
which they seek the following expert witness fees: 
a. Ralph F. Evans, architect $ 500.00 
b. Dean Webb, Structural Engineer 4,390.67 
c. John K. Bushnell, M.A.I. Appraiser 9,000.00 
d. Robert J. Holmes, M.A.I. Appraiser 3,912.00 
e. John C. Brown, A.S.A. Appraiser 600.00 
Total $18,402.67 
Of the foregoing, only Dean Webb, John K. Bushnell, and 
Robert J. Holmes were called to testify at trial as expert 
witnesses. The Affidavit of the landowners1 counsel relative 
to these expenses is obviously devoid of any competent 
evidence as to the ••reasonableness11 of these charges and, the 
charges themselves create additional issues on which the 
District Court will need direction from this Court. 
If this Court construes ••costs" to include "litigation 
expenses19 this matter must be remanded to the District Court 
for determination of several issues. Those issues include: 
1. An indication to the District Court that the 
District Court still has discretion as to whether or not those 
litigation expenses are taxable or not. The subject statute 
is permissive in nature and must be interpreted in light of 
the fact that in this particular case the expert witnesses 
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testified as to a value figure ($660,000) which was obviously 
not accepted by the jury. It is well within the discretion of 
the District Court, even if the Court ruled that it must 
consider under the Court1s interpretation of the statute the 
possibility of the award of these costs, to disallow them in 
light of the fact that the position advocated by the "experts" 
appeared to the jury to be untenable. This is a serious 
question of whether it is reasonable to spend $20,000 in 
expert witness fees plus $10,000 in attorneys' fees, which 
were awarded in this matter, to obtain additional compensation 
of $30,000. 
2. There is an issue concerning the "reasonableness" of 
the expert witness fees. John K. Bushnell an M.A.I, appraiser 
charged $9,000, while a fellow M.A.I, appraiser who, according 
to the trial and record of this case, did an equal amount of 
work, charged $3,912. $1,100 is claimed for expert witnesses 
who never testified at trial. Even those states which allow 
the taxing of expert witness costs have restricted such costs 
to witnesses who actually testify at trial. (See, state 
Department of Highway v. Salemi, 249 La. 1078, 193 So.2d 252, 
254 (1967).) 
If this Court construes the statute to allow litigation 
expenses, it should remand this case to the trial court for 
consideration of all of the issues above identified. 
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POINT III 
THE LANDOWNERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES INCURRED IN THIS 
APPEAL 
It is submitted that if the Court rules in favor of the 
Respondents on the issues raised herein, the landowners would 
not be entitled to a award of attorneys1 fees in this matter 
incurred by this Appeal* 
CONCLUSION 
The conditions upon which the Order of Immediate Occu-
pancy was issued by the District Court never came into 
existence and by the very terms and provisions of said Order 
of Immediate Occupancy the same never became effective. 
Because the Order never became effective, the provision 
therein which would have permitted the landowners interest on 
the deposited funds and possession of the property to the RDA 
are ineffective. The landowners were entitled to the normal 
and statutory "costs11 incurred in this matter, but are not 
under §11-19-23.9 of the UTAH CODE ANN. entitled to "litiga-
tion expenses" as part of those costs. Each of the parties 
should be required to bare their own "costs" incurred in this 
Appeal. 
DATED this day of January, 1988. \ 
Harold A. Hintze 
u=. 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a four copies each of the 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT (RDA) to 
William D. Oswald 
57 West 200 South #400 
P. 0. Box 45450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake City 
B. Ray Zoll 
5251 South Green Street #205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Attorney for neighboring owners 
John T. Evans 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main St. #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellants/Defendants Burge, Barrows, 
and Barrows 
Jerome H. Mooney, III 
Kyle Treadway 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants Daskalas, The Pawn Shop, 
Anderson, and Pantelakis 
Brant Wall 
WALL & WALL 
Boston Building #800 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants Daskalas, The Pawn Shop, 
and Pantelakis 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 




JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT 
G. BARROWS; BEATRICE 
IRENE BARROWS; ELLEN K. 
DASKALAS, an individual, 
dba THE PAWN SHOP, THE PAWN 
SHOP, a Utah Corporation; 
JAMES ANDERSON, an indi-
vidual, dba JIM'S RIBS; 
TERRY PANTELAKIS, an indi-
vidual, dba AAA JEWELERS 
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND 
SALES, INC., a Utah Corpora-
tion; 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY 
Civil No. C85-4017 
JUDGE: Hon. Homer F. 
Wilkinson 
Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy and Defendant Burge, Barrows and Barrows' 
Motion came on for a hearing pursuant to notice before 
- 2 -
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge on 
August 13, 1985 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiff being 
represented by Harold A. Hintze, Esq. and William D. 
Oswald, Esq., and Michael Chitwood Executive Director of 
the Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency being present, the 
defendants Juniata Irene Burge, Beatrice Irene Barrows 
and Robert G. Barrows being present and represented by 
John T. Evans, Esq. the defendants Ellen K. Daskalas, an 
individual, dba The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James 
Anderson, an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry 
Pantelakis, an individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans, 
and Loans and Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation, neither 
appearing personally nor by and through their attorney 
of record Jerome Moody, Esq., said defendants having 
been served timely notice of said Motions but having 
heretofore filed a Stipulation for Immediate Occupancy 
which is on file herein, and Ray Zoll representing 
himself as a property owner and as attorney for the 
following land owners in Block 57, Plat "AM, Salt Lake 
City Survey and located at 235 South Main Street, David 
Mortensen, Erv Wilfred, 235 South Main Associates, 235 
South Main, Inc., Egan and Associates, and Harold Egan, 
the parties and other land owners having reached an open 
court stipulation which has been recited and agreed to 
orally before the Court on August 13, 1985, said 
Stipulation to be the basis of an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy. ,%f> 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND 
ADJUDGED: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy of the following described property, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point 166 feet west of the 
northeast Corner of Lot 6f Block 57, Plat 
"A", Salt Lake City Survey, and running 
thence east 69 feet to the center of a 17 
inch party wall and which point is further 
evidenced by a metal plug inserted in the 
sidewalk north of said wall by R.W. 
Sorensen, licensed surveyor; thence south 
110 feet; thence west 68 feet; thence south 
55 feet; thence west 1 foot; thence north 
165 feet to the point of beginning. 
may be granted subject to and upon the following terms 
and provisions: 
(a) Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of 
the Court upon signing of this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy the sum of $275,220.00, being 100% of the 
appraised value of the subject property based upon a 
written appraisal obtained by plaintiff. While retained 
by the Clerk of the Court, said funds shall be invested 
by the Clerk at the highest interest rate available for 
federally insured accounts. The plaintiff, however, 
agrees and warrants that said funds will earn interest 
at an effective rate of 11.5 annual percentage rate for 
the term of which they are held by the Clerk of the 
Court, not to exceed a period of three years from the 
date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and that any 
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shortfall or difference between the actual interest 
earned by virtue of the Clerkfs investment and the 11.5 
annual percentage rate shall be paid by the plaintiff to 
the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows upon demand as 
herein provided. While said funds are on deposit with 
the Clerk of the Court, all or any part of said funds 
may be withdrawn hereafter at the option of defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows, or any of them, upon a 
written demand of Burge, Barrows and Barrows or their 
counsel of record. The withdrawal of all or any part of 
said deposited funds by defendants Burge, Barrows and 
Barrows shall constitute a waiver of any and all 
defenses to the taking by condemnation of the subject 
property as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, except the issue of just 
compensation which shall then be the sole issue reserved 
for trial. 
(b) On entry of this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
shall submit within ten (10) days of the date hereof to 
Lincoln Property Company N.C., Inc. (Lincoln) for 
signature an Agreement for Distribution of Land for 
Private Development (ADL). Said ADL must be fully 
executed by the Redevelopment Agency and Lincoln within 
thirty (30) days from date hereof. Within thirty (30) 
days from execution of the ADL by Lincoln, the 
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Redevelopment Agency shall pay Burge, Barrows and 
Barrows $76,450.00 as hereinafter described and exercise 
its option to purchase and the owners shall sell the 
property located at 235 South Main Street, owned by 
Mountain States Creamery Company and David Mortensen 
pursuant to the written Offer to Purchase dated April 5, 
1985 and the Extension Agreement extending said Offer to 
sixty (60) days from date hereof. The Redevelopment 
Agency in disbursement of the purchase price for said 
Mortensen property may withhold, and Mortensen 
authorizes the Redevelopment Agency to pay to and assign 
to the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows from said 
funds, and solely from said funds, the sum of $76,450.00 
to be paid to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows upon 
the closing of the Redevelopment Agency's acquisition of 
David Mortensenfs interest in the property located at 
235 South Main Street, but not to exceed thirty (30) 
days from the date Lincoln executes the ADL. Said sum 
of $76,450.00 shall be paid as additional compensation 
over and above any just compensation ultimately found by 
the court or jury in this case to be the fair market 
value of the property being condemned herein and the 
receipt of said funds shall not be an offset or 
deduction from said just compensation and the receipt of 
the same shall not be disclosed to the jury. Upon 
payment to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows of the +* 
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sum of $76,450.00, said defendants by receipt thereof, 
waive any and all defenses to the taking by condemnation 
of the subject property in the same manner as would 
occur by withdrawal of funds deposited with the Clerk of 
the Court pursuant to the aforementioned Section 
78-34-9. 
(c) David Mortensen's obligation in 
regards to the payment of the aforementioned $76,450.00 
is solely conditioned upon the Redevelopment Agency's 
election to exercise its right of acceptance under the 
aforementioned Offer to Purchase the property at 235 
South Main Street and if the fund from which this 
partial assignment has been made does not come into 
existence and Mortensen is not paid at least $76,450.00 
or entitled to immediate payment thereof by virtue of 
the fact that the Offer to Purchase is not consummated 
for any reason, said Mortensen shall have absolutely no 
liability to make any payments to the defendants Burge, 
Barrows and Barrows by virtue of this Order. 
(d) This Order of Occupancy shall not be 
effective unless or until, (1) the ADL is signed by 
Lincoln Property and the Redevelopment Agency within 
thirty (30) days from date hereof, and the sum of 
$76,450.00 above provided has been paid pursuant to the 
terras and provisions herein, or (2) the defendant land 
owners have withdrawn all or part of the $275,220.00 
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deposited with the Clerk of the Court as herein 
provided. 
(e) Based upon the terms and conditions of 
the oral Stipulation made to the Court, the Court does 
hereby enter an Order of Immediate Occupancy that the 
subject property is sought for uses by the public in 
connection with and as part of a redevelopment project 
authorized and approved by the City Council of Salt Lake 
City and the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, and 
the plaintiff is authorized to take immediate possession 
of said property and continue in possession of the same 
pending further hearing and trial on the issue of just 
compensation which, subject to the terms and provisions 
herein, is the only issue which may be raised in this 
action as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. Plaintiff or its agents may 
do such work thereon as may be required for the purposes 
for which said property is sought to be condemned 
including, but not limited to, demolition of existing 
improvements and construction of new improvements or 
structures, without interference by defendants or any of 
defendants1 partners, agents, or employees, however, no 
demolition of the existing building, collecting of rent, 
or eviction of existing tenants pursuant to said Order 
of Immediate Occupancy will occur until the defendants 
have either withdrawn part or all of the $275,220.00 
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deposited with the Clerk of the Court as provided herein 
or have received payment from David Mortensen through 
the Redevelopment Agency of the $76/450,00 as herein 
provided. 
2. The Redevelopment Agency stipulates to 
extend the offers for purchase of the condominium 
properties located at 235 South Main Street, which 
include the owners represented herein by B. Ray Zoll, 
for sixty (60) days from the date hereof. 
3. Defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows1 
Motion in regards to the manner of disbursement of funds 
to be deposited with the Clerk as above described came 
on for a hearing and no one appearing in opposition 
thereto, the Court being duly advised in the premises 
and good cause appearing therefore, now orders that 
under the terms of occupancy by the tenant-defendants, 
to-wit: Ellen K. Daskalas, an individual, dba The Pawn 
Shop, The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James Anderson, 
an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry Pantelakis, an 
individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans, and Loans and 
Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation of the subject premises, 
said tenants have no right or claim to the proceeds to 
be awarded in this action as just compensation and that 
all sums paid pursuant to this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy and by virtue of the final judgment of just 
compensation shall be the sole property of, and are to 
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be paid directly to the owner-defendants, to-wit: 
Juniata Irene Burge, Robert G. Barrows and Beatrice 
Irene Barrows without notice to or approval by the 
tenant-defendants. 
Dated this /S day of August, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
APROVED AS TO FROM: 
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN 
By //MM**?* //)AA/^£^/ 
William D. Oswald 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City 
omer F. Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
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Harold A. Hintze 
Special Counsel for Plaintiff 
2230 University Parkway 
Suite 9E 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-9300 
William D. Oswald 
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN 
57 West 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-7751 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 




JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT ' 
G. BARROWS; BEATRICE ; 
IRENE BARROWS; ELLEN K. 
DASKALAS, an individual, 
dba THE PAWN SHOP, THE PAWN : 
SHOP, a Utah Corporation; 
JAMES ANDERSON, an indi-
vidual, dba JIM'S RIBS; 
TERRY PANTELAKIS, an indi-
vidual, dba AAA JEWELERS : 
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND 
SALES, INC., a Utah Corpora-: 
tion; 
Defendants. 
i ORDER OF IMMEDIATE 
I OCCUPANCY 
: Civil No. C85-4017 
JUDGE: Hon. Homer F. 
i Wilkinson 
: 
Plaintifffs Hotion. for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy and Defendant Burge, Barrows and Barrows* 
Motion came on for a hearing pursuant to notice before 
°*4Pr 
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The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge on 
August 13, 1985 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiff being 
represented by Harold A. Hintze, Esq. and William D. 
Oswald, Esq., and Michael Chitwood Executive Director of 
the Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency being present, the 
defendants Juniata Irene Burge, Beatrice Irene Barrows 
and Robert G. Barrows being present and represented by 
John T. Evans, Esq. .the defendants Ellen K. Daskalas, an 
individual, dba The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James 
Anderson, an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry 
Pantelakis, an individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans, 
and Loans and Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation, neither 
appearing personally nor by and through their attorney 
of record >Jerome Mopdyc Esq. bpf^said defendants ,having falfct/24W<\ 
yjju***&'iyftMu/v*"*^ c)/s?c* rcf ^ UM(H<^ MM* ^W^^y ' 
heretofore filed a Stipulation for Immediate Occupancy 
which is on file herein, and Ray Zoll representing 
himself as a property owner and as attorney for the 
following land owners in Block 57, Plat "A", Salt Lake 
City Survey and located at 235 South Main Streetf David * /^ Cq^ 
Mortensen, Erv Wilfred, and Harold Egan,.the parties and 
other land owners having reached an open court 
stipulation which has been recited and agreed to orally 
before the Court on August 13, 1985, said Stipulation to 
be the basis of an Order of Immediate Occupancy. 




1. Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy of the following described property, to-wit: 
may be granted subject to and upon the following terms 
i and provisions: _ _ 
/ 
\ Beginning at a point 166 feet west of the 
\ northeast Corner of Lot 6, Block 57
 f Plat 
\ "A" , Salt Lake City Survey, and running 
I thence east 69 feet to the center of a 17 
\ inch party wall and which point is further 
evidenced by a metal plug inserted in the 
sidewalk north of said wall by R.W. 
Sorensen, licensed surveyor; thence south 
\ 110 feet; thence west 68 feet; thence south 
\ 5 5 feet; thence west 1 foot; thence north 
\ 165 feet to the point of beginning, 
(a) Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of 
the Court upon signing of -an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy the sum of $275,220.00, being 100% of the 
appraised value of the subject property based upon a 
written appraisal obtained by plaintiff. While retained 
by the Clerk of the Court, said funds shall be invested 
by the Clerk at the highest interest rate available for x$&Z% 
federally insured accounts. The plaintiff, however. 
agrees and warrants that said funds will earn interest 
at an effective rate of 11.5 annual percentage rate for 
the term of which they are held by the Clerk of the 
Court, not to exceed a period of three years from the 
date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and that any 
shortfall or difference between the actual interest 
earned by virtue of the Clerkfs investment and the 11.5 
' « ' w w« * fD 
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annual percentage rate shall be paid by the plaintiff to 
the defendants Burge, Barr/ows and Barrowl^as herein 
provided. While said funds are on deposit with the Clerk 
of the Court/ >any or\all/part of said funds may be 
withdrawn hereafter at the option of.defendants Burge, 
Barrows and Barrows, or any of them, upon a written 
demand of their counsel of record* The withdrawal of 
all or any part of said deposited funds by defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows shall constitute a waiver of 
any and all defenses to the taking by condemnation of 
the subject property as provided in Section 78-34-9, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, except the issue 
of just compensation which shall be the sole issue 
reserved for trial. 
(b) On entry of £he Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
shall submit.to Lincoln Property Company N.C., Inc. 
(Lincoln) for signature aryi^Agreement for Distribution 
of Land for Private Development (ADD. Said ADL must be 
fully executed by f^ he Redevelopment Agency andjLincoln 
within thirty (30; days from date ^ ereof* Within thirty 
^3XU_days^from execution of theADL/\ the Redevelopment 
Agency shall)exercise its option to purchased the 
property located at 235 South Main Street, owned by 
Mountain States Creamery Company and David Mortensen, 
pursuant to the written Offer to Purchase dated April 5, 
1
 't f 
^JS \>fcV- ^ > - ^ 
(.MUM''*'wwr? VVT , _j- . _ ^ 
1985 and the Extension Agreement extending said Offer to 
sixty (60) days from date hereof. *:The Redevelopment y ^H!^ 
Agency in disbursement ox^rhe^purchase price ^ of said vWl'ttr / ^ ^ 
property may withhold and Mortensen authorizes the 
Redevelopment Agency to pay to and assign to the 
defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows from said funds, 
and solely from said funds, .the sum of $76,4 50.00 to be 
paid to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrlowsjupon the 
closing of the Redevelopment Agency's acquisition of 
paid as additional compensation over and above any just 
compensation ultimately found by the court or jury in 
this case to be the fair market value of the property 
being condemned herein and the receipt of said funds 
shall not be an offset or deduction from said just 
compensation and the receipt of the same shall not be 
disclosed to the jury. Upon payment to defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows of the sum of $76,450.00, 
said defendants by receipt thereof, waive any and all 
defenses to the taking by condemnation of the subject 
property in the same manner as would occur by withdrawal 
of funds deposited with the Clerk of the Court pursuant 
to the aforementioned Section 78-34-9. 
(c) David Mortensen*s obligation in 










is solely conditioned upon the Redevelopment Agency's 
election to exercise its right of acceptance under the 
aforementioned Offer to Purchase the property at 235 
South Main Street and if the fund from which this 
partial assignment has been made does not come into 
' existent by virtue of the fact that the Offcer to ' 
Purchase is not accepted by the Redevelopment Agency, 
said Mortensen shall have no liability to make any 
payments to the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows by 
rM^h virtue of this Ord( i ^ ^«Y*H^the ADI 
NeUvV *^* t h n p^H^ty^^piiwrrr^^-fty^^^y /Within t h i r t y 
jifit-^signed by L inco ln 
Property \^ndy 
(x~) " —\ 
(30) days from date hereof jj^orA the defendant land owners \ 
^ ^ l i a v e jacrtT withdrawn a l l or part of the $ 2 7 5 , 2 2 0 . 0 0 
d e p o s i t e d with the Clerk of the Court as h e r e i n / 
\ i u jfche sum of $ 7 6 , 4 5 0 . 0 0 above provided has / 
P£jwJJL&d1cJ~e*z==r^the sum o: 
r R<f€ been (paid, pursuant t o >n  DUI 
here in* t h e n t h i s Or 
and vo id and upon Hoti 
Order of Immediate Occ 
showing tha t t h e t e 
been complied w i t 
the terms and p r o v i s i o n s y 
Immediate Occupancy is null 
f
ot either of the parties, said 
ncy may be vacated upon a 
provisions herein have not 
(e) Based/ upor^ x 
the oral Stipulation made to the Qburt,, the Court^does 
hereby enter an Order of Immediate Occupancy that the 
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connection with and as part of a redevelopment project 
authorized and approved by the City Council of Salt Lake 
City and the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, and 
the plaintiff is authorized to take immediate possession 
of said property and continue in possession of the same 
pending further hearing and trial on the issue of just 
compensation which, subject to the terms and provisions 
herein, is the only issue which may be raised in this 
action as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. Plaintiff or its agents may 
do such work thereon as may be required for the purposes 
for which said property is sought to be condemned 
including, but not limited to, demolition of existing 
improvements and construction of new improvements or 
structures, without interference by defendants or any of 
defendants1 partners, agents, or employees, however, no 
demolition of the existing buildincLior^eviction of 
existing tenants pursuant to said Order of Immediate 
Occupancy will occur until the defendants have either 
withdrawn part or all of the $275,220*00 deposited with 
the Clerk of the Court as provided herein or have 
received payment from David Mortensen through the 
Redevelopment Agency of the $76,450.00 as herein 
provided. » 
ji. Defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows1 




to be deposited with the Clerk as above described came 
on for a hearing &nd no one appearing in opposition 
thereto, the Court being duly advised in the premises 
1
 | and good cause appearing therefore, now orders that 
under the terms of occupancy by the tenant-defendants, 
to-witi Juniata ikene Burge, Robert G* Barrows, and (AM4^^/( 
i 






tenants have no right or claim to the proceeds to be 
awarded in this action as just compensation and that all 
sums paid pursuant to this Order of Immediate Occupancy 
and by virtue of the final -judgment of just compensation 
*- >vare t o **e Pa*^ diarectly ro^the owner-defendants, to-wit 
Juniata Irene Burge, Robert G. Barrows and Beatrice 
Irene Barrows without notice to or approval by the 
ir
» I tenant-defendants. 
xu
 Dated this day of August, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
-" j Homer F. Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
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APROVED AS TO FROM: 
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN 
By. 
William D. Oswald 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt 




John .p. Evans 
Attorney for Defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows 
Ray Zoll 
Attorney for Defendants * . . .JA^/A 
Mortensen, Wilfred and E g a n j j a ^ ' " * ^ 
and Pro Se 
